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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
COPYRIGHT-Protection Denied to Verbal Expression 
of Simple Subject Matter-Morrissey 
v. Procter & Gamble Co.* 
The plaintiff copyrighted a series of rules for a sales promotional 
contest in which contestants' social security numbers were used as the 
basis for a "sweepstakes." In 1959 he submitted the contest rules and 
game suggestions to several companies, including the defendant 
Procter & Gamble Company, to see if they were interested in using 
his scheme. The defendant failed to accept or even to respond to the 
plaintiff's solicitation. However, three years later Procter & Gamble 
initiated a "Shopping Fling Sweepstakes" which utilized contestants' 
social security numbers as the basic element of the game. Plaintiff 
brought an action for copyright infringement in the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming that the 
defendant's first contest rule was copied from rule I of his copy-
righted game. The district court granted summary judgment to the 
defendant, holding that defendant had proved that it had not had 
access to the copyrighted material, and that in any event the rule 
was not copyrightable since it was based on a relatively simple idea 
and evidenced no "original creative authorship."1 On appeal to the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, held, affirmed on other 
grounds. The First Circuit concluded that the district court's analysis 
of both the access issue and the question of originality was incorrect. 
However, the court affirmed on the ground that so "straightforward 
and simple" a matter could be expressed in only a "limited number'' 
of ways;2 therefore, to permit copyright protection of a "mere hand-
ful of forms" would exhaust all future use of the substance or idea of 
the contest. 
This reluctance to uphold patent-like protection under the Copy-
right Act3 was first expressed in Baker v. Selden,4 decided by the 
United States Supreme Court in 1879. In Baker, the plaintiff had 
copyrighted a bookkeeping text consisting of an explanation of "T" 
accounting and an appendix of various forms to be utilized in apply-
ing the system. The Supreme Court ruled that although the explana-
tion of the system was copyrightable, the appendixed "blank" forms 
were not: 
• Morrissey v. Procter &: Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) [hereinafter 
principal case]. 
1. Morrissey v. Procter&: Gamble Co., 262 F. Supp. 737 (D. Mass. 1967). 
2. Principal case at 676. 
l!. 17 u.s.c. chs. I-!! (1964). 
4. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
[ 167] 
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The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit 
of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art 
itself. The object of the one is explanation; the object of the other 
is use. The former may be secured by copyright. The latter can only 
be secured, i£ it can be secured at all, by letters-patent.5 
The main purpose of the explanation-use dichotomy established 
in Baker was to prevent individuals from securing "back-door" patents 
through the use of the copyright laws. The Court was concerned 
about the potential "blocking" effect of granting copyright protec-
tion; such a monopoly upon the forms which comprised the account-
ing system would obviously have inhibited the use and development 
of the process described in the text. Baker was applied easily to 
temperature charts,6 tax record sheets,7 and other blank forms.8 The 
cases are far from consistent, however, and copyrightability has been 
upheld in clear "use" situations even without the presence of the 
additional complicating factor of some form of verbal expression. 
Thus discount charts for negotiable instruments,9 freight tariff in-
dices, 10 trade catalogues, 11 and the like12 were distinguished from 
the forms in Baker and found worthy of copyright protection. 
While there were writings on the accounting forms in Baker, they 
were merely column headings, not verbal explanations. In llforrissey, 
on the other hand, outright verbal expression was at issue, thereby 
distinguishing Baker on its facts. This extension of the Baker prin-
ciple into the context of purely verbal expression conflicts with the 
analytical approach taken earlier by the Court of Appeals for the 
5. 101 U.S. at 105. See also 37 C.F.R. § 202.l(c) (1968) (regulations of the Copyright 
Office); H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 15 n.l (1967) which indicate that 
under the present and proposed Copyright Acts respectively, blank forms are not copy-
rightable. 
M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 37.3-37.4 (1966), disagrees with the Baker conclusion as 
to noncopyrightability of blank forms. He feels that there was a sufficient difference 
between Selden's and Baker's forms to have simply held no infringement. He bases 
his conclusion partially on a Supreme Court comment in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 
201, 217 (1954): "We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument 
that the intended use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates 
its registration. We do not read such a limitation into the copyright law." 
6. Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 
801 (1947); Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943), 
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 785 (1944). 
7. Aldrich v. Remington Rand, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Tex. 1942). 
8. See, e.g., Brief English Sys., Inc. v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
283 U.S. 858 (1931) (stenographic short-type system and speedwriting booklets); Amberg 
File &: Index Co. v. Shea Smith &: Co., 82 F. 314 (7th Cir. 1897) (indexing system). 
9. Edwards &: Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman, 15 F.2d 35 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 273 U.S. 738 (1926). 
10. Gutherie v. Curlett, 36 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1929). 
11. B &: B Auto Supply, Inc. v. Plesser, 205 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
12. See, e.g., Gordon v. Weir, 111 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich. 1953), affd, 216 F.2d 
508 (6th Cir. 1954) (dot-counting contest), New Jersey Motor List Co. v. Barton Busi-
ness Serv., 57 F.2d 353 (D.N.J. 1931) (list of applications for motor vehicle registrations). 
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Second Circuit in Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley.13 In Con-
tinental Casualty, the defendant Beardsley had copyrighted a six-page 
pamphlet incorporating three pages of explanatory essays and three 
pages of forms which were to be used in writing insurance against 
the loss of securities. Continental Casualty had adopted similar forms, 
and sought a declaratory judgment that Beardsley's copyrights were 
invalid and an injunction to prevent Beardsley from bringing 
an infringement suit. The District Court for the Southern District 
of New York granted the injunction on the alternate grounds of 
noncopyrightability and divestitive publication.14 The Second Circuit 
affirmed the judgment, but disagreed with the district court on the 
question of whether the forms were copyrightable; the court refused 
to extend the Baker rationale to verbal expressions, even when their 
subject matter was very limited. The court attempted to distinguish 
Baker by concluding that Beardsleys' expression of the idea had been 
inextricably incorporated with the forms, thereby combining "ex-
planation" with "use."15 To avoid the obvious disadvantages of 
granting monopoly protection to ideas for a system or process, the 
Continental Casualty court imposed a strict test of infringement, 
stating that "[t]o constitute infringement in such cases a showing of 
appropriation in exact form or substantially so of the copyrighted 
material should be required."16 The court concluded that the simi-
13. 253 F.2d 702, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958). 
14. 151 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
15. The logic of the Continental Casualty approach is somewhat impaired by the fact 
that the explanatory language, which the court found distinguished Continental Casu-
alty from the Baker case, was used merely to accomplish the functional purpose of the 
form; that is, the words on the form serve both as exposition and application of the 
insurance plan. But the accounting forms in Baker served the same dual purpose, and 
that decision prevented copyright protection for accounting forms from being used to 
limit use of the related accounting plan. While the same kind of limitation was not 
placed on the scope of protection in Continental Casualty, the test of infringement 
applied may have the same effect, even though copyrightability was found. Recent 
Development, Copyright Protection for ''Blank Forms", 47 CALIF. L. REv. 174, 177 
(1959). 
16. 253 F.2d at 705. This combination of an easy test for copyrightability and a 
strict standard for infringement had been criticized earlier in Crume v. Pacific Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 182, 184-85 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755 (1944) [quoting 
Dorsey v. Old Sur. Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872, 874 (10th Cir. 1938)]: 
To say that an idea, plan, method or art described in a copyright is open to the 
public, but that it can only be used by the employment of different words and 
phrases which mean the same thing borders on the preposterous. It is to exalt 
the accomplishment of a result by indirect means which could not be done 
directly. It places a premium upon evasion and makes this the test of infringe-
ment .••• [T)here is no room for the skill of the mechanic or artisan in utilizing 
the plan or method disclosed. Its use, to which the public is entitled, can be 
effected solely by the employment of words descriptive thereof. In our view, 
where the use can be effected only in such manner, there can be no infringement 
even though the plan or method be copied. We realize that such a view leaves 
little, if any, protection to the copyright owners; in fact it comes near to invalidat-
ing the copyright. 
Brightley v. Littleton, 37 F. 103 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1888) was the only case which totally 
supported Continental Casualty on the copyrightability of the forms. The plaintiff 
therein was the author of a series of blank forms intended to be filed by applicants 
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larity of the two sets of forms did not meet the enunciated criterion; 
accordingly, it decided that there was no infringement. 
Morrissey and Continental Casualty represent distinct analyti-
cal approaches to the problem of how to prevent statutory copy-
right from securing a patent-like monopoly of an idea, system, or 
process. Morrissey is an extension of the principle of Baker v. Selden 
to the verbal expression of subject matter which can be explained 
only in a limited number of ways; but because of its facts, Morrissey 
does cast doubt on the viability of the explanation-use dichotomy 
expressed in Baker. Still, in suggesting that the mathematical finite-
ness of the forms of expression is an appropriate test of copyright-
ability, the First Circuit provided a significant analytical tool for 
other courts to use in efforts to avoid the undesirable blocking of the 
practice of an art. Unlike the Continental Casualty approach, which 
allows copyrightability in the first instance and then tests for 
"substantial" similarity, the lviorrissey rationale denies copyright-
ability from the outset if there are only a few ways to express the 
particular subject matter. The Morrissey approach seems both to 
yield more predictability and to express more forthrightly the courts' 
concern about stifling the practice of the "useful arts." 
The mathematical-finiteness concept provides a relatively objec-
tive criterion for determining when the grant of copyright protection 
would prove to be an impediment to further development and use of 
an art. In the past, although the courts have been hesitant to grant 
copyright protection in all situations for this very reason, highly 
subjective tests of copyrightability have been employed. For example, 
Professor Kaplan has isolated the constituent elements of literary 
works into something of a continuum: "language, incident, plot, 
theme, and ideas."17 Obviously, the continuum runs from the specific 
-language or "expression"-which is protectible, to the general-
ideas-which are not.18 The idea-expression dichotomy, although 
designed to serve the same ends as the Morrissey principle, is really 
little more than a labeling technique applied to the results of par-
ticular cases. It is an unpredictable approach and, unless employed 
carefully, it can result in upholding the statutory grant of protection 
in inappropriate circumstances. Nevertheless, in some cases where 
authors have sued for infringement of elements of incident, plot, or 
for a retail liquor license under an 1887 Pennsylvania law. The clerk of a court drafted 
up some similar forms. The court held that the forms were copyrightable as a book 
and that there had been an infringement. · 
17. B. KAPLAN&: R. BROWN, COPYRIGHT 245 (1960). 
18. For a dissent from the proposition that "ideas"-particularly in the television 
format field-should not be protectible, see Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The 
Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass Communicatiom World, in ASCAP, COPYRIGHT LAW 
SYMPOSIUM 30 (1968). 
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theme of their copyrighted works, the courts have stressed the com-
monplace nature of the appropriated elements and have held that 
such parts of the whole are not entitled to copyright protection.19 
Whatever the difficulties of defining what parts of a literary work are 
protectible, it is apparent that those parts which are not protectible 
are being preserved for other authors to draw upon. This rationale 
would argue against granting copyright protection to something that 
might be viewed as a "stock" literary device.20 Similarly, in the rather 
confused area of copyright protection of characters, the courts have 
exhibited concern about tying up the use of "stock characters" 
through statutory copyright.21 
As has been suggested, these kinds of concerns closely parallel 
19. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d U9, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. 
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931), where Judge Hand stated: 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increas-
ing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. 
The last may be perhaps no more than the most general statement of what the play 
is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this 
series of abstractions when they are no longer protected, since otherwise the play-
wright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expres-
sion, his property is never extended. Nobody has been able to fix that boundary, 
and nobody ever can. [Citation omitted.] 
In commenting upon the similarity in theme of plaintiff's play and defendant's movie, 
Hand said: 
ITJhere is no monopoly in such a background. Though the plaintiff discovered 
the vein, she could not keep it to herself; so defined, the theme was too generalized 
an abstraction from what she wrote. It was only a part of her ideas ••.• [H]er 
cop}Tight did not cover everything that might be drawn from her play; its content 
went to some extent into the public domain. 
45 F.2d at 122. See 17 U.S.C. § I (1964) for the full scope of protection available 
under the Copyright Act. 
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 150 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 
790 (1945) at 612 summed up the prior Second Circuit decisions thus: "The principle 
••• is that only in the 'expression' of a copyrighted work does any monopoly inhere; 
the 'theme,' the 'plot,' the 'idea' may always be freely borrowed." See also Columbia 
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 
F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940); Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1929); Dymow v. 
Bolton, ll F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926). 
20. Cf. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936), where the court did extend protection to a series of 
events employing what might be called stock literary devices. However, in speaking of 
"parallelism of incident" Judge Hand stressed that the sequence of the details involved 
constituted "the very web of the authors' dramatic expression; and copying them is 
not 'fair use.'" 81 F.2d at 55. 
21. See Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 
945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955), where the court stated: 
It is conceivable that the character really constitutes the story being told, but 
if the character is only the chessman in the game telling the story he is not within 
the area of protection afforded by the copyright •••• 
We conclude that even if the [copyright) owners assigned their complete rights 
in the copyright to the [defendant], such assignment did not prevent the author 
from using the characters used therein, in other stories. The characters were 
vehicles for the story told, and the vehicles did not go with the sale of the story. 
See also Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122, where Judge Hand 
indicated that copyright protection for stock characters would be improper. 
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the reasoning in Morrissey. I£ the purpose of the copyright statute 
is to "promote ... useful Arts,''22 decisions about the extent of copy-
right protection must be considered carefully. A stock character or a 
stock device is described in a book or play in discrete verbal form, 
but to permit an author to secure through his copyright a monopoly 
on the use of the device or character in other works seems to impede 
rather than promote the practice of the literary art. And, determin-
ing that a character or a device is "stock" certainly implies the ac-
ceptability of a mathematical-finiteness test of copyrightability.23 
The usefulness of the Morrissey test as an analytical tool will be 
slight if its limitations are not recognized. Thus, while Morrissey is 
not restricted, as was the Baker case, to works which require indepen-
dent textual explanation, caution must be exercised in attempting 
to apply the Morrissey principle to "nonutilitarian" works. The "low 
parameter" art forms-those in which the range of expression is 
necessarily limited-provide illustrations of works for which the 
mathematical-finiteness principle is appropriate and those for which 
it is not. Architecture is a field in which present copyright standards 
limit protection to blueprints and allow copying of the final product, 
the building.24 This limited protection may be an implicit recogni-
tion of the mathematical-finiteness principle: it would be unfortunate 
to allow a "mere handful of forms," or even ten thousand forms, to 
exhaust all future use of many utilitarian architectural innovations. 
Music, on the other hand, is "nonutilitarian" in the sense that it lays 
no claim to being functional; its importance lies within itself rather 
than in communicating rules or directing the construction of build-
ings. Thus, the danger which Morrissey seeks to forestall-blocking 
the use of underlying utilitarian ideas-is not present when passing 
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 states: "The Congress shall have Power ••• To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 
Clause 8 is both the copyright and the patent clause. For a detailed analysis of the 
meaning, historical background, and evolution of the various words and phrases 
in the copyright clause, see M. NIMMER, CoPYRIGHT §§ 1-9 (1966). For the early history 
of copyright see R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND I.Aw 1-34 (1912). See B. 
KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 1-37 (1967), for an excellent historical 
overview. 
23. See notes 16, 20-21 supra and accompanying text. 
24. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.12 (1968) for a Copyright Office regulation which indicates 
that architectural blueprints are to be copyrighted as "drawings or plastic works of a 
scientific or technical character." This means that the exclusive rights granted to the 
holder of copyrighted blueprints are not governed by 17 U.S.C. § l(b), which states 
that a copyright holder has the exclusive right "to complete, execute, and finish it if 
it be a model or design for _a work of art." Therefore, the copyright proprietor of a 
blueprint has exclusive rights under § l(a) "[t]o print, publish, copy, and vend the 
copyrighted work," but no exclusive rights as to execution of the design, See generally 
De Silva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962); Muller v. 
Triborough Bridge Authority, 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Strauss, Copyright in 
Architectural Works, Study No. 27, in I STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 87 (1963). 
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on the copyrightability of a musical work.25 Nonetheless, while cau-
tion is indicated in applying mathematical finiteness to the field of 
music, the principle should not be ignored altogether in considera-
tion of musical works.26 Use of the .Morrissey approach might have 
produced the opposite result in Fred Fisher Inc. v. Dillingham,27 
where Judge Learned Hand held that a mere eight-note bass os-
tinato28 in Jerome Kern's "Kalua" had infringed the bass ostinato in 
"Dardanella." In reaching this unfortunate result, Hand discounted 
the clear differences between the melodies of the two songs and the 
rather mechanical way in which the bass was used. But most im-
portant, he seemed to ignore the full import of the brevity of the 
eight-note series: the shorter a sequence of notes, the more likely it 
is that it will be needed in other compositions. The extreme case of 
a two-note sequence illustrates the principle-every two-note se-
quence has been needed, and used, thousands of times. If the Dilling-
ham principle were in common use today, substantial limitations on 
musical creation might result. The finiteness test, limited by recog-
nition that the protected idea is a musical idea and not "utilitarian," 
would be useful in avoiding such consequences. To use the prin-
ciple, the courts must be willing to break down musical compositions 
into component parts-in effect looking for "stock" elements which 
should be preserved for later composers to incorporate into their 
works. In applying the concept, however, the courts should recall 
Justice Holmes' comment in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing 
Co.29-one that is still relevant to the establishment and application 
25. This is not to say that there is no danger in the exhaustion of musical ideas 
by the overly broad extension of copyright protection. Such a danger exists, but it is a 
danger of restricting ideas within the art form and is reasonably manageable under 
established rules. Morrissey seeks to protect ideas which are not inherent in the 
expression-ideas concerning contest rules are not ideas of English prose, but merely 
ideas expressed in English prose. 
26. Music is really quite limited, mathematically, as an art form. L. HILLER &: M. 
ISAACSON, EXPERIMENTAL MUSIC 11 (1959), quoting Cassiorderus (circa 485-575) defined 
the mathematical quadrivium as follows: 
Mathematical science is that science which considers abstract quantity. By abstract 
quantity we mean that quantity which we treat in a purely speculative way, 
separating it intellectually from its material and from its other accidents, such as 
evenness, oddness, and the like. It has these divisions: arithmetic, music, geometry, 
astronomy. Arithmetic is the discipline of absolute numerable quantity. Music is 
the discipline which treats of numbers in their relation to those things which are 
found in sound. [Emphasis added.] 
If this attitude appears a bit peculiar today, perhaps it is only a result of nineteenth 
century Romantic conditioning to think of music completely in terms of its emotional 
appeal. 
27. 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
28. The ostinato bass is a set of repeated notes along a bass line. Actually, only a 
four-note pattern was involved, and it was repeated in two successive measures. The 
melody prevailed over the bass in aural perception, as would be expected. 
29. 188 U.S. 2!19 (190!1). 
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of any test substantially limiting the copyrightability of artistic 
works: 
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the 
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial 
illustrations outside the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the 
one extreme works of genius would be. sure to miss appreciation. 
Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had 
learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may be 
more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya, or 
the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when 
seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied 
to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge.a0 
The finiteness test is most easily applied to games, game rules, 
and to any legal or quasi-legal forms31 where the choice of language 
is restricted because the imprimatur of the courts has been applied to 
only a few select phrases. It is precisely in this area that the Conti-
nental Casualty approach appears to break dmvn. If infringement 
consists of "appropriation in exact form or substantially so of the 
copyrighted material," use of legal forms-which requires exact 
"tracking" of the operative language-seems to be impossible without 
infringement. Application of the principle of mathematical :finiteness 
to deny copyrightability to such forms avoids this difficulty. 
If we confine our inquiry to utilitarian works, the subject of 
greatest impact may be the computer program. Such programs have 
been copyrightable since 1964, under an administrative rather than 
a judicial or legislative decision.32 Basically, programming is a ·writing 
30. 188 U.S. at 251-52. 
31. Obviously the word "forms" includes complete forms for deeds, leases, trusts, 
wills, and contracts. It could also include the kind of insurance forms treated in 
Continental Gas. Co. v. Beardsley (see notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text) and 
other utilitarian forms (See notes 3-8 supra and accompanying text). There is also little 
reason to distinguish books which contain form clauses for deeds, leases, trusts, wills, 
and contracts, since these clauses, like complete forms, are included for the purpose of 
being "tracked" in their language. 
32. See N.Y. Times, May 8, 1964, at 43. Programs are copyrightable if it can be 
shown that they have authorship (U.S. CoNST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8), that the statutory 
notice requirements have been met [17 U.S.C. § 10 (1964)], and that the version sub-
mitted to the Register is directly perceivable by humans. See Copyright Office Cir. 31D 
(Jan. 1965), and the original statement of position, Copyright Office, SML-47 (June 
1964). Cf. the proposed revision of the Copyright Act, S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 
(1967), which states that 
Copyright protection subsists . . • in original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they 
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with 
the aid of a machine or device. [Emphasis added]. 
For an explanation of the importance of the concept of "fixation," see H.R. REP. No. 83, 
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1967). 
George D. Cary, Deputy Register of Copyrights, wrote in 1964 that the decision 
by the Copyright Office was "an administrative decision that, based upon existing 
judicial precedents and statutory law, the courts might agree that a computer program 
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technique that uses mathematical language to instruct the machine to 
complete certain operations with or upon the data stored in its cells.33 
The program passes through various physical transmutations before 
it can be employed in the computer: hand·written draft; flow chart; 
punched cards; and magnetic tape (possibly in several different com-
puter languages).34 Although much of the current debate about the 
copyrightability of computer programs correctly focuses on the dif-
ficult problems of which of these stages can qualify for copyright 
protection35 and how the concept of infringement will be applied 
to such a staged process,36 the :Morrissey principle obviously goes 
to the question of whether programs are copyrightable at all. 
The inherent mathematical logic involved in formulating program-
med instructions limits the possible number of efficient alternatives 
available in the construction of a particular program, unless the 
programmer wants to introduce superfluous functions into the 
sequence. Thus, the potential applicability of the Morrissey rationale 
should be obvious. 
It has been suggested that copyright protection should be given to 
the "program package,"37 without compelling an individual to obtain 
a copyright on all of the variations resulting either from different 
sequences of commands or from the addition of superfluous func-
tions.38 Such an approach would presumably make it impossible to 
"program around" a copyright,39 and would lead to the kind of re-
is a 'writing' in the constitutional sense." Cary, Copyright Registration and Computer 
Programs, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc. 361, 362 (1964). See also Puckett, The Limits of 
Copyright and Patent Protection for Computer Programs, in ASCAP, COPYRIGHT LAW 
SYlllPOSlUM (Number 16) 102-04 (1968). 
33. For an explanation of programming, see Puckett, note 432 supra, at 136-42 
(appendix entitled "An Itroduction to Computer Programming"). 
34. Id. See also Note, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 64 Counr. L. 
REV. 1274, 1276-77 (1964). 
35. This debate centers on whether the program, at some or all of its stages 
of existence, is a "writing." See Note, supra note 34 (pro copyrightability); Jacobs, 
Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets, in COMPUTERS AND THE LAW 90, 91 (Bigelow 
ed. 1966) (contra copyrightability). See also the proposed Copyright Act § 102, supr~ 
note 32. 
36. At present, the Copyright Office talces the position that if someone reduces a 
copyrighted literary work, at the stage of input into the computer, to cards or magnetic 
tape, there has been infringement. This rigid position can be criticized because the 
output which the alleged infringer seeks to generate may very well not constitute an 
infringement despite the fact that the copyrighted work was fed into the computer in 
its entirety at the input stage. 
37. Katona, Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 955, 
967-71 (1965). 
38. Even if program owners were forced to copyright each variation, this would be 
possible because there are computers that can supply all possible alternatives to the 
basic program for the performance of any given function. 
39. See Bender, Computer Programs: Should They Be Patentable?, 68 COLOM. L. 
REV. 241, 250 (1968); notes 41-43 infra and accompanying text. 
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sults which the First Circuit found unacceptable in Morrissey. In 
arguing that patent is the appropriate form of protection for pro-
grams, Bender notes that copyright protection is unsatisfactory be-
cause it cannot "protect the principle underlying a mechanism or 
process as well as the specific form."40 Though Bender suggests that 
"perhaps minor changes in form will not render a program suffi-
ciently different to avoid a charge of 'substantial infringement,' "41 
it seems clear that a strict application of the Continental Casualty 
approach could prove him wrong.42 
On the other hand, the Morrissey approach has some advantage 
in this area. The complexity of computer programs (in terms of the 
number of characters, assembled into sequential commands, involved) 
means that the finite number of variations of a given program is 
probably greater than the number of possible variations of expression 
of rule I of a shopping sweepstakes. However, at least if this greater 
finite number of variations of a computer program results simply 
from a reordering of the same commands present in the first pro-
gram or from the addition of superfluous functions to the first pro-
gram, it is clear that we are dealing with a subject matter susceptible 
of a limited number of forms of expression. Given this fact, the 
Morrissey principle, if applied, would deny copyrightability to the 
program and eliminate any chance that the original author could 
"appropriate" its subject matter. The Continental Casualty approach, 
because it allows copyright to attach in the first instance, is more 
risky; there is a chance that a court would understand that the pro-
gram variant being tested for infringement incorporated only in-
significant changes, albeit a large number of them, and that it would 
find infringement. 
This analysis does not imply that all computer programs should 
be barred from copyright protection. The more complex the pro-
gram-the more operations it includes and functions it performs-
the more likely it is that the mathematical-finiteness test will indicate 
that the program should be protected. Programs to run hospitals, 
space centers, steel mills, or other large institutions are of such a 
creative nature and so expensive to develop that public policy may 
dictate some form of protection.43 In this field, as in the others dis-
40. Bender, Computer Programs: Should They Be Patentable?, 68 Coun.r. L. REv. 
241, 250 (1968). 
41. Id. at 249. 
42. For a brief acknowledgement of the applicability of Continental Casualty to 
computer programs, see Puckett, supra note 32, at 101. 
43. See Bender, supra note 40, at 245-46 (footnotes omitted): 
Programs are expensive to develop .••• Without the knowledge that it can earn 
royalties from the use of its products by others, a company is frequently reluctant 
to make the necessary investment of time and money. At present, the program 
must be useful enough to the developer himself to warrant the investment. If it is, 
he will frequently wish to prevent competitors from copying it. Secrecy results •••• 
If the only available form of protection is secrecy . . • program hoarding will 
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cussed above, the concern should be to exclude from protection those 
elements which others may need to advance the art. If there are 
"building block" elements in computer programs, elements which 
are susceptible of a very few forms of expression, the A1orrissey ap-
proach can assure that they will be freely available. This considera-
tion is obviously very important in dealing with relatively new and 
undeveloped communications techniques such as those afforded by 
computer technology. 
Admittedly the Morrissey principle looks more to the social detri-
ment that would result from granting copyright protection than to 
an objective evaluation of the work's characteristics.44 As suggested 
above, however, several other criteria should be considered in con-
junction with this aspect of mathematical-finiteness test. Of course, 
these factors include: (1) the "sweat of the brow" exerted by the 
creator, and the extent of his financial investment;45 (2) the creativity 
exemplified in the work;46 and (3) the sophistication of the particular 
art involved. 
Practical administration of the finiteness test should also be con-
sidered. Congress and the courts have never allowed the Copyright 
Office to play a significant supervisory role in determining the basic 
question of copyrightability. The judicial elimination, in effect, of 
the "originality" requirement as a test of copyrightability is an 
example of this.47 Moreover, the draft of the new Copyright Act does 
reduce the utility of new programs and choke off the sort of technical dialogue 
that nourishes the art. 
See also Burck, The Boundless Age of the Computer (part II), FORTUNE, April 1964, 
at 141. 
44. See Recent Development, supra note 15, at 175. 
45. See, e.g., Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 189 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1951); 
Leon v. Pacific Tel. &: Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling 
Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Gorman, Protection for the Collection 
and Representation of Facts, 76 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1569 (1963); Bahnzhaf, Copyright Pro-
tection for Computer Programs, 64 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1274, 1286 (1964). 
46. See Rl:GIS'I'ER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT ON THE GENERAL 
R.EvISION OF TIIE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1961): 
It is well established, by a long line of court decisions that in order to be copy-
rightable under the statute a work must meet the following requirements: 
(a) the work must be in form of a "writing" • • . . 
(b) the work must be a product of original creative authorship. 
Two interrelated elemen~ _are ~nvolved here: originality and creativity. 
(I) The work must be original m the sense that the author produced it by his own 
intellectual efforts as distinguished from merely copying a pre-existing work. 
(2) The work must represent an appreciable amount of creative authorship. 
See also M. NIMMER, CoPYlUGHT §§ 3.2, 6 (1967). 
47. "Originality" as a criterion of copyrightability has come to mean merely that 
a given expression originated with the author; it does not refer to the novelty of the 
subjec_t matter. See Whist Club v. Foster, 42 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1921); Burrow-Giles Litho-
graphic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); Alfred Bell &: Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 
Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); Withol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1956) (dictum)· 
Yankwich, Legal Protection of Ideas-A Judge's Approach, 43 VA. L. R£v. 375 377 
~~ . 
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not enlarge the Copyright Office's role in this area.48 Nevertheless, 
the general arguments in favor of administrative agencies-argu-
ments which stress the development of efficiency and expertise in 
dealing with particular kinds of problems-are applicable in the 
copyright field as well. The mathematical-finiteness test, if supple-
mented and clarified with administrative regulations, could be far 
less subjective than a test of "originality." It provides a real oppor-
tunity to shift the initiative for decisions about copyrightability 
from the courts, where it now rests and would continue to rest 
under a Continental Casualty approach, to the Copyright Office. 
The administrative body could be delegated authority to make the 
initial determination of copyrightability; judicial review would of 
course be preserved for applicants who were aggrieved by the de-
cision of the Register of Copyrights. 
lvI.orrissey can be viewed as a subtle plea for a re-evaluation of the 
entire system of copyright protection rather than a minor refinement 
of traditional doctrine. The concept of mathematical finiteness is not 
a panacea for curing all copyright ills, but it should serve as a start-
ing point for further discussion. Our rapidly expanding technology 
confronts us with many problems similar to those raised by the 
copyrighted contest rule or contract clause; because of the tremen-
dous costs that a "back-door patent" in technology could engender in 
this area, however, the stakes are much higher. Near the end of An 
Unhurried View of Copyright, Professor Kaplan discusses the devel-
oping technology and suggests that in the future "copyright or the 
larger part of its controls will appear unneeded, merely obstructive, 
as applied to certain sectors of production and that here copyright 
law will lapse into disuse and may disappear."49 Baker v. Selden rec-
ognized the need to eliminate copyright protection where it was 
obstructive. Morrissey, decided almost ninety years later, represents 
a very important step in fulfilling Kaplan's prophecy. 
In comparison, the Patent Office has a considerable role to play in determining 
whether the statutory standards for patent (admittedly much more stringent than 
those for copyright) have been met. The standards for patent are set forth in 115 U.S.C. 
§§ 101-03 (1964). The Supreme Court has described the difficulty of qualifying for 
patent protection in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 11 U.S. 53 (1884) at 59: 
"In regard, however to the kindred subject of patents for invention, they cannot by law, 
be issued to the inventor until the novelty, the utility, and the actual discovery or 
invention by the claimants have been established by proofs before the Commissioner 
of patents . . . ." 
48. See S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 7 (1967) ("Copyright Office"). 
49. B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 121 (1966). 
